659A.030(1)(f), whistleblowing under ORS 659A.199, and public employee whistleblowing under ORS 659A.203. The trial court granted summary judgment to the city and the plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed as to the first two claims and affirmed as to the last. Regarding the ORS 659A.203 claim, the court held the violation of law about which a public employee blows the whistle must be a violation committed by the employee’s employer not just any governmental entity. Because the plaintiff had only blown the whistle on wrongdoing by the district (not the city), he had no valid claim under that statute. Regarding the ORS 659A.030(1)(f) claim, the appellate court held there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff’s protected activity was a substantial factor in the city’s decision to terminate his employment. Regarding the ORS 659A.199 claim, the court held the plaintiff’s conduct constituted a report of a violation of state law within the meaning of the statute because the plaintiff reported the wrongdoing to his employer, and he did not voice his opinion about the alleged violation to his supervisors and coworkers as part of the decision-making process; the alleged violation had already occurred and it concerned a matter outside the scope of the plaintiff’s day-to-day responsibilities as IT manager. Further, the court held there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the plaintiff’s subjective good faith belief in making that report. Finally, the court held the city may be liable as the plaintiff’s joint employer and that the co-employer district’s alleged biased motive may be imputed to the city under a “cat’s paw” theory. ORS 656.018, the Workers’ Compensation exclusivity statute, does not violate the Remedy Clause as applied to claims by a deceased worker’s adult, nondependent children for loss of the worker’s society and companionship. Pierce v. Best Western Int’l, Inc., 331 Or App 753 (2024); Mooney, J. The plaintiff was represented by Travis Eiva. The plaintiff is the personal representative of a worker who was killed in an on-the-job accident while employed by the defendant. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for negligence, Employer’s Liability Law claims, and premises liability, asserting that upon the worker’s death her three adult children suffered profound injuries from the loss of her society and companionship. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the action was barred by ORS 656.018, which makes workers’ compensation the exclusive remedy for such claims, and which does not name adult, nondependent children as beneficiaries. The plaintiff countered that ORS 656.018 is unconstitutional as applied because it deprived the worker’s children of a remedy for their loss in violation of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the defendant. The plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the matter is resolved by Kilminster v. Day Management Corp., 323 Or 618 (1996), and Juarez v. Windsor Rock Products, Inc., 341 Or 160 (2006), which held an action such as the one brought here does not allege an injury protected by the Remedy Clause. The court further held that Horton v. OHSU, 359 Or 168 (2016), did not overturn Kilminster or Juarez. Between the Sheets continued from p. 57 “[T]he Workers’ Compensation exclusivity statute, does not violate the Remedy Clause as applied to claims by a deceased worker’s adult, nondependent children for loss of the worker’s society and companionship.” 58 Trial Lawyer | Summer 2024
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