45 Trial Lawyer • Winter 2024 See Sheets 46 30.265(3). The trial court next granted the state’s subsequent summary judgment motion, on the argument that ORS 30.265(6)(a) immunizes the state from liability for injury claims “covered by any workers’ compensation law.” This appeal ensued. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the claims against the individual employees were permissible under the OTCA. Joined by OTLA amicus, the plaintiff further argued that the immunity provision at ORS 30.265(6)(a) is unconstitutional and violates the remedy clause under Horton. The state argued that the court need only consider the second issue and the court agreed, limiting its analysis to whether the state and its employees were constitutionally immunized from liability under ORS 30.265(6)(a). Pursuant to that provision the court concluded that, although the plaintiff may not pursue any claim against the negligent third-party state employees as would have been permissible under Oregon’s Workers Comp Law, ORS 30.265(6)(a) cannot be read as unconstitutionally denying “any remedy” for their breach of duties owed to the plaintiff under Horton’s analysis of “Category 1” claims. Under the Horton analysis for “Category 2” claims, which looks to whether the legislative action instituted a constitutionally sufficient “quid pro quo,” the court initially recognized that the common law would have permitted claims against both the plaintiff’s employer and the state employees, but sovereign immunity would have precluded an action against the state. The court determined, however, that the “the net result” of the Legislature’s enactment of the workers’ compensation scheme (in 1913) which permits actions against negligent third-parties, and the OTCA (in 1967) which waives state immunity only in certain circumstances, “is that every person injured by the tortious conduct of a state employee has some form of remedy designed to ensure some form of compensation, whether it be workers’ compensation or tort remedies against the state, up to the damages caps.” The court further concluded that its prior cases established that the workers’ compensation benefits obtained from a plaintiff’s private employer was a “substantial remedy” and not a “paltry sum” for purposes of determining whether immunizing the state and its negligent employees violates the remedy clause. A tort claims notice generally describing a plaintiff’s “potential claims” is deficient to the extent that it does not provide sufficient detail relating to the place and circumstances of the alleged misconduct. Moore v. Portland Public Schools, 321 Or App 391 (2023); Nakamoto, S.J. The plaintiffs were represented by Rebecca Cambreleng and Alana Simmons. Caitlin Mitchell and Elizabeth Savage filed an amicus brief on behalf of OTLA. These consolidated appeals arose out of hostile work environment, discrimination and battery claims brought by the plaintiffs, who worked as paraeducators in special education classrooms at various Portland Public Schools (PPS). The plaintiffs appeal from several rulings the trial court made on the defendants’ motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against them, including the trial court’s dismissal of a portion of the plaintiffs’ claims for failing to provide adequate tort claims notices, the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ battery claims for failure to state a claim against PPS, the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims for hostile work environment for failure to state a claim, and the dismissal of the individual defendants and substitution of PPS as the sole defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiffs’ tort claims notices were deficient because, although they described generally the plaintiffs’ “potential claims,” they did not
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