47 Trial Lawyer • Spring 2024 See Sheets 48 dissenting opinion. In examining the text, context, and legislative history of ORS 12.115(1), Justice Masih attributed significance to the fact that the legislature chose to forgo broader wording from another statute, ORS 12.110(1) — “injury to person or rights of another” — when it enacted ORS 12.115(1). Justice Masih determined that generally, under the common law, negligent injury to property included only physical damage to real or personal property, as opposed to purely economic loss. Justice Masih noted that, even though the attorneyclient relationship may require attorneys to protect a client’s economic interests outside the common law of negligence, that did not necessarily mean that purely economic loss constitutes an injury to “property” under the statute. Justice Masih concluded that, had the legislature intended ORS 12.115(1) to impose a definite cutoff for all professional malpractice claims regardless of the type of injury, it would have used the broader wording of “injury to person or rights of another” that already existed in ORS 12.110(1). Where an insurance company negligently fails to investigate and pay a claim, causing the insured to suffer economic and noneconomic damages, the insured has a legally viable negligence claim. Moody v. Oregon Community Credit Union, 371 Or 772 (2023). The plaintiff was represented by Travis Eiva. Jim Coon filed an amicus brief on behalf of OTLA. The plaintiff’s husband was accidentally shot and killed by a friend during a camping trip. The plaintiff filed a claim for life insurance benefits, but her insurer denied the claim. She then sued the insurer, alleging, among other claims, a claim for negligence. In her negligence claim, she alleged that the insurer had negligently failed to investigate and pay her claim for policy benefits, causing her to have fewer financial resources to navigate the loss of a claim against a third-party insurer for breach of contract, barred its consideration of the viability of the plaintiff’s claims. In the majority’s view, permitting the recovery of emotional distress damages was consistent with the recovery of emotional distress damages in other common-law actions and would not place an undue burden on life insurers. Moreover, the plaintiff’s claimed harm was of sufficient importance as a matter of public policy to permit her to recover damages. For all those reasons, the court held that the plaintiff had alleged a legally protected interest sufficient to subject the insurer to liability for emotional distress damages. Justice Garrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Duncan and Senior Justice Balmer joined. The dissent concluded that the plaintiff’s negligence claim was foreclosed by the court’s decision in Farris, which, according to the bread-winning spouse and, consequently, to suffer economic harm and emotional distress. The insurer moved to dismiss and strike the allegations, which the trial court granted. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. In a majority opinion, the court held that the plaintiff had pleaded facts sufficient to give rise to a legally cognizable commonlaw negligence claim for emotional distress damages. In its analysis, the court first determined that ORS 746.230 suggests the existence of a legally protected interest by imposing a legal obligation designed to protect insureds and their beneficiaries from the type of emotional harm that results from delayed claims. The court acknowledged, but rejected, the insurer’s argument that the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Farris v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 284 Or 453, 587 P2d 1015 (1978), which involved a
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